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DOMESTIC VICTIMS AREN’T THE ONLY VICTIMS:  
DEPORTING ALIENS WHO COMMIT VIOLENT CRIMES, 
REGARDLESS OF THE VICTIM’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
OFFENDER 
CARLY D. SELF* 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Unless they commit crimes involving moral turpitude or crimes of do-
mestic violence, aliens are not deportable for just any violent crime.  So, if 
an alien batters his live-in girlfriend, he may be deported, but if he batters a 
stranger on the street, he may not be.  Under the Immigration and Nationali-
ty Act (INA), “[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime of domestic vio-
lence . . . is deportable.”  The problem is determining whether the domestic 
requirement must be an element in the underlying state criminal statute to 
make the alien deportable under the federal INA.  
 Federal circuit courts are split about which of three approaches may be 
used to determine whether a state crime satisfies the federal deportation 
statute.  Only one approach – the circumstance-specific approach – allows a 
court to consider other evidence in determining whether a state conviction 
satisfies the federal INA’s requirements.  This Article will analyze the three 
approaches and determine that the circumstance-specific approach should 
be used.  It will also propose that the INA should be modified, so aliens 
would be deportable for all crimes of violence, not only for crimes of vio-
lence against domestic victims. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Political leanings likely influence what many Americans think about 
aliens and deportation, but many might agree that if an alien commits a vio-
lent crime, that alien should be deported.1  The Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) is the federal statute that provides several offenses for which an 
alien may be deported.2  Aliens are deportable for a wide variety of wrongs, 
ranging from minor issues like failing to provide notice of a change of ad-
dress3 to serious crimes like espionage4 and aggravated felonies.5  But un-
less they commit crimes involving moral turpitude6 or crimes of domestic 
violence,7 they are not deportable for just any violent crime.8   
Under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, found at 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i), “[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime of domestic 
violence . . . is deportable.”9  The problem is determining whether the do-
mestic requirement needs to be an element in the underlying state criminal 
statute to make the alien deportable under the federal INA.10  Courts have 
used three approaches to determine whether a conviction under a state stat-
ute may justify deportation under the federal INA.11  The first two ap-
proaches, the categorical and modified categorical approaches, require that 
the state statutes include the relevant federal elements as part of the state 
offense, so the domestic requirement would need to be a specific element in 
the state statute for an alien to be deported under the federal INA for com-
mitting a crime of domestic violence.12  But the third approach, the circum-
stance-specific approach, allows a court to consider other evidence in de-
termining whether a state conviction satisfies the federal INA’s 
 
1. See Voters Want to Build A Wall, Deport Felon Illegal Immigrants, RASMUSSEN 
REPORTS, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immigration/august_201
5/voters_want_to_build_a_wall_deport_felon_illegal_immigrants (last visited June 29, 2016) 
(stating that eighty percent of likely Republican voters support deporting illegal aliens with felony 
convictions). 
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). 
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(A) (2008).  
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) (2008); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i) (2008). 
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008). 
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008). 
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2008). 
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2008). 
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). 
10. Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259, 262-64 (4th Cir. 2015). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 263. 
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requirements.13  Therefore, under the circumstance-specific approach, the 
alien could be deported if he or she had been convicted of a crime of vio-
lence that did not have a domestic element in the underlying state statute, if 
a court could ask a witness – like the convicted alien – whether he or she 
had a domestic relationship with the victim.14  Federal circuit courts are 
split about which approaches courts may use in interpreting the INA.15 
Part II of this Article will discuss the history of the three approaches 
and the current circuit split.  Part III will propose that Congress should 
modify the INA to establish a uniform circumstance-specific approach.  It 
should also delete the word domestic from the provision allowing aliens to 
be deported for crimes of domestic violence, so aliens would be deportable 
for all crimes of violence, not only for crimes of domestic violence.  Part IV 
will conclude that the circuit split may resolve itself but that the proposals 
from Part III will expedite the process and yield consequences that are fairer 
and more uniform.   
II. BACKGROUND 
Deportability for crimes of domestic violence was added to the INA in 
1996.16  Specifically, section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA provides that 
“[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of do-
mestic violence . . . is deportable.”17  It defines a crime of domestic vio-
lence as follows: 
 
[T]he term “crime of domestic violence” means any crime of vio-
lence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18) against a person com-
mitted by a current or former spouse of the person, by an individu-
al with whom the person shares a child in common, by an 
 
13. Id. at 264. 
14. Id. at 263. 
15. See Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 624 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the categorical and 
modified categorical approaches in determining whether a conviction constituted a crime of do-
mestic violence before the 2009 holdings); Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 
2013) (using the categorical and modified categorical approaches in holding that for the “crime 
involving moral turpitude” provision of section 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), the state statute must 
have an “involving moral turpitude” element); Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (using the cir-
cumstance-specific approach in determining that for the “crime of domestic violence” provision of 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), the statute need not have a “domestic” element).  
16. James Lockhart, Validty, Construction, and Application of § 237(a)(2)(E) of Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §1227(a)(2)(E)), Providing for Removal of Alien for Domestic 
Violence, Stalking, Child Abuse, Neglect or Abandonment, or Violation of Protection Order, 40 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 27 (2009). 
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2008). 
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individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the person 
as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the 
person under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdic-
tion where the offense occurs, or by any other individual against a 
person who is protected from that individual's acts under the do-
mestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, 
Indian tribal government, or unit of local government.18 
 
Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) refers to section 16 of Title 18 to define a crime 
of violence, and it does so two ways.  First, “an offense that has as an ele-
ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another” is a crime of violence.19  In addition, “any 
other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be 
used in the course of committing the offense” is also a crime of violence.20  
So, a crime of violence has been defined,21 but the question becomes 
whether an underlying state offense must include a specific domestic-
relationship element or whether Congress meant to use the word domestic 
as a qualifier to explain how the victim must be related to the defendant al-
ien.22 
Before 2009, to determine whether certain convictions under predicate 
state statutes satisfied the federal INA’s requirements for deportability for 
different offenses,23 courts followed the 1990 landmark case of Taylor v. 
U.S.24  Taylor allowed only the categorical and modified-categorical ap-
proaches to be used to determine whether a state conviction satisfied a fed-
eral sentence-enhancement statute.25  But in 2009, the Supreme Court used 
a circumstance-specific approach in an immigration case for the first time.26  
And earlier in 2009, the Supreme Court held that for a similarly worded 
federal statute, having a domestic requirement under the federal statute does 
 
18. Id. 
19. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (West 2015). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (West 2015), invalidated by United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 
719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). 
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2015)). 
22. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 262-66.  
23. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624.  
 24.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
25. Id. 
26. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009) (using the circumstance-specific approach in 
a case with a dollar-amount qualifier, instead of the “domestic” qualifier). 
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not require the predicate state statute to include a domestic-relationship el-
ement.27  Since 2009, circuits have split on whether these decisions mean 
that the INA’s domestic requirement requires a domestic-relationship ele-
ment under the predicate state statute or whether courts may use a circum-
stance-specific approach along with the categorical and modified categori-
cal approaches to determine whether a state conviction satisfies the federal 
INA’s domestic-relationship requirement.28 
A. THREE APPROACHES TO DETERMINING WHETHER PREDICATE 
STATE STATUTES MUST INCLUDE AS ELEMENTS CERTAIN 
TERMS FROM FEDERAL STATUTES 
Congress specified that conviction, not conduct, triggers immigration 
consequences.29  Therefore, courts have long used the categorical and modi-
fied-categorical approaches in the immigration context even though they 
originated in the criminal context.30  However, more recently, some courts 
have also begun applying the circumstance-specific approach in immigra-
tion cases.31  
1. The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “[w]hen possible, 
[courts] apply the ‘categorical’ approach, ‘looking only to the statutory def-
inition[ ] of the prior offense.’”32  Under this approach, the court only looks 
at the state statute to see if its elements correspond to the federal statute’s 
elements.33  The facts of the underlying state case are irrelevant; instead, the 
focus is on “whether ‘the state statute defining the crime of conviction’ cat-
 
27. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009) (holding that for purposes of the Gun 
Control Act, to satisfy the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, . . . the domes-
tic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt . . . need not be a defin-
ing element of the predicate offense”). 
28. See Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624 (using the categorical and modified categorical approaches 
in determining whether a conviction constituted a crime of domestic violence before the 2009 
holdings); Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916 (using the categorical and modified categorical ap-
proaches in holding that for the “crime involving moral turpitude” provision of section 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), the state statute must have an “involving moral turpitude” element); Hernandez-
Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (using the circumstance-specific approach in determining that for the 
“crime of domestic violence” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), the statute need not have a 
“domestic” element). 
29. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 264 (internal quotation omitted). 
30. Id. at 263 (citation omitted). 
31. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 30. 
32. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600) (alterations in original). 
33. See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 264. 
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egorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding 
[crime].”34  The term generic means that “the offenses must be viewed in 
the abstract, to see whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal 
offense . . ..”35  “Accordingly, a state offense is a categorical match with a 
generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense ‘necessarily 
involved [. . .] facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense].’”36  So, for 
purposes of the crime-of-domestic-violence section of the INA, “[u]nder the 
categorical approach, one need only look to the statutory definition of the 
[state] offense to see if it contains the necessary elements of a ‘crime of 
domestic violence’ under the INA.  If the elements do not correspond, the 
inquiry stops there.”37 
Under Taylor, when the state statute does not make it clear that the un-
derlying state offense categorically matches the generic federal offense, 
courts should next apply the modified-categorical approach.38  Thus, if the 
underlying state offense is not clearly a removable offense under the INA, 
courts may look beyond the state statute’s language to “a narrow, specified 
set of documents that are part of the record of conviction, including ‘the in-
dictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, 
or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’”39  However, courts still may 
not look “beyond the record of conviction itself to the particular facts un-
derlying the conviction.”40  When these documents do not “establish that 
the offense the [alien] committed qualifies as a basis for removal under sec-
tion 237(a)(2)(E)(i), [courts] are compelled to hold that . . . the conviction 
may not be used as a basis for removal.”41   
2. The Circumstance-Specific Approach 
When “the INA incorporates other criminal statutes wholesale, . . . it 
‘must refer to generic crimes,’ to which the categorical approach applies.”42  
On the other hand, “[w]hen the federal statute does not describe a generic 
 
34. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005) (plurality opinion)) (altera-
tions in original). 
37. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 263. 
38. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 613, 620 (citation omitted). 
39. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc)). 
40.  Id. at 620 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). 
41. Id. at 620-21 (citing United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
42. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1678, 1691.  
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offense, but instead ‘refer[s] to the specific acts in which an offender en-
gaged on a specific occasion,’ the circumstance-specific approach is appro-
priate.”43  For example, placing an exception “in the INA . . . suggests an 
intent to have the relevant facts found in immigration proceedings.”44 
 Under the circumstance-specific approach, “while the congruence of 
the elements of the underlying [state] offense and the offense described in 
the federal statute must be assessed using the categorical approach, courts 
may consider other evidence to see if the necessary attendant circumstances 
existed.”45  Under this approach, for purposes of the INA’s crime-of-
domestic-violence section, “the court may also consider underlying evi-
dence of the conviction to determine if a domestic relationship existed.”46  
Specifically, the domestic relationship “can be proven by evidence general-
ly admissible for proof of facts in administrative proceedings,”47 including 
evidence like probable-cause affidavits, the criminal complaint and plead-
ings, the defendant’s admissions during proceedings, and the sentencing 
sheet.48  
B. TIMELINE OF COURTS USING THE THREE APPROACHES, 
INCLUDING THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA provides that “[a]ny alien who at 
any time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence . . . is 
deportable.”49  For almost two decades, courts almost exclusively followed 
the categorical and modified categorical approaches laid out in the 1990 de-
cision in Taylor v. U.S.50  But in 2009, the Supreme Court used a circum-
stance-specific approach in an immigration case51 and held that under a 
similar federal statute, having a domestic requirement under the federal 
statute does not require the underlying state statute to include a domestic-
 
43. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 259, 264 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34) (alteration 
in original). 
44. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1691. 
45. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 264 (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42-43). 
46. Id. at 263. 
47. Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2010). 
48. Id. 
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2008). 
50. E.g., Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 613, 624. Contra Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 671 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (stating that the INA’s domestic requirement did not mean that the underlying state 
statute needed a domestic-relationship element and considering evidence beyond the record of 
conviction in finding that the defendant was in a domestic relationship with the victim). 
51. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 29, 30.  
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relationship element.52  Since then, circuits have split on whether state stat-
utes need a domestic-relationship element for an alien to be deportable un-
der the INA and whether courts may use a circumstance-specific approach 
to determine whether a state conviction satisfies the INA’s domestic-
relationship requirement.53  
1. Using the Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches 
Before the 2009 Supreme Court Decisions 
In 1990, the Supreme Court articulated the categorical and modified-
categorical approaches in Taylor v. U.S.54  In Taylor, the Court had to de-
termine whether a second-degree burglary conviction under a state statute 
met the generic burglary definition of a federal sentence-enhancement stat-
ute.55  The Court rejected the idea that burglary should be defined by state 
statutes because those varied so greatly: one state’s burglary statute prohib-
ited stealing from unoccupied automobiles, while another’s had varying de-
grees of breaking and entering without ever using the word burglary.56  The 
Court also rejected the common-law definition of burglary, because most 
states no longer included all of the old common-law elements.57  Instead, 
the Court reasoned that “Congress meant . . . ‘burglary’ [in] the generic 
sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.”58 
After deciding which definition of burglary it thought Congress intend-
ed, the Court moved on to the question of whether a state statute satisfied 
the generic federal definition of burglary.59  The Court first reasoned that 
the federal enhancement statute’s language “supports the inference that 
 
52. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 415, 418 (holding that for purposes of the Gun Control Act, to satisfy 
the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,”. . . the domestic relationship, alt-
hough it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , need not be a defining element of the 
predicate offense”). 
53. See Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624 (using the categorical and modified categorical approaches 
in determining whether a conviction constituted a crime of domestic violence before the 2009 
holdings); Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916 (using the categorical and modified categorical ap-
proaches in holding that for the “crime involving moral turpitude” provision of section 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), the state statute must have an “involving moral turpitude” element); Hernandez-
Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (using the circumstance-specific approach in determining that for the 
“crime of domestic violence” provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), the statute need not have a 
“domestic” element). 
54.  Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 615 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575). 
55. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578-79. 
56. Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted). 
57. Id. at 593-94 (citation omitted). 
58. Id. at 598 (citation omitted). 
 59.  Id. at 600. 
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Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the de-
fendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and 
not to the facts underlying the prior convictions” because the federal statute 
referred to a defendant with “‘three previous convictions’ for—not a person 
who has committed—three previous violent felonies or drug offenses.”60  
And the statute defined a “‘violent felony’ as any crime punishable by im-
prisonment for more than a year that ‘has as an element’—not any crime 
that, in a particular case, involves—the use or threat of force.”61  
Second, the Court reasoned that the enhancement statute’s legislative 
history showed that “Congress generally took a categorical approach to 
predicate offenses. There was considerable debate over what kinds of of-
fenses to include and how to define them.”62  “[B]ut no one suggested that a 
. . . crime might sometimes count towards enhancement and sometimes not, 
depending on the [case’s] facts . . . .”63   
Third, the Court reasoned that it would be difficult and potentially un-
fair to use a factual approach.64  Potential problems include whether the 
government would be allowed to introduce the trial transcript or witnesses’ 
testimonies before the sentencing court and whether the sentencing court’s 
conclusion “that the defendant actually committed a generic burglary” 
could be challenged as abridging the defendant’s right to a jury trial.65  It 
also noted that with guilty pleas, “there often is no record of the underlying 
facts,” so “[e]ven if the Government were able to prove those facts, if a 
guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary offense was the result of a plea bargain, 
it would seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as if the defendant 
had pleaded guilty to burglary.”66  The Court reasoned that the “only plau-
sible interpretation of [the federal sentence-enhancement statute] is that . . . 
it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and 
the statutory definition of the prior offense.”67  
However, the Court acknowledged that this “categorical approach . . . 
may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in 
a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the 
 
60. Id. 
61. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. 
 62.  Id. at 601. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 601-02. 
67. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
          
2018] DOMESTIC VICTIMS AREN'T THE ONLY VICTIMS 97 
 
elements of generic burglary.”68  For example, if a state’s burglary statutes 
include entry of an automobile and a building, if the charging paper and ju-
ry instructions “show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary 
of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building 
to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for 
enhancement.”69  The Court ultimately held that “an offense constitutes 
‘burglary’ for purposes of a . . . sentence enhancement if either its statutory 
definition substantially corresponds to ‘generic’ burglary, or the charging 
paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements 
of generic burglary . . . to convict the defendant.”70 
But in 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached a slightly 
different conclusion in a case about the deportation statute at issue in this 
Article: it held that evidence beyond the statute’s elements – like police re-
ports – may be considered and that a federal statute’s “domestic” require-
ment did not need to be an element of the state offense to satisfy § 
237(a)(2)(E).71  In Flores v. Ashcroft, an alien plead guilty to misdemeanor 
battery72 after police reports stated that he attacked and beat his wife.73  The 
court reasoned that “it may be necessary . . . to rely on some aspects of the 
defendant’s actual behavior . . . to know what he has been convicted of: 
when one state-law offense may be committed in multiple ways, and federal 
law draws a distinction, it is necessary to look behind the statutory defini-
tion.”74  The court pointed out that “[a]lthough § 16(a) directs attention to 
the statutory elements, § 237(a)(2)(E) . . . departs from that model by mak-
ing the ‘domestic’ ingredient a real-offense characteristic.”75   
The court held that “when classifying the state offense of battery for 
purposes of § 16(a), . . . the inquiry begins and ends with the elements of 
the crime.”76  But the “‘domestic partner’ . . . requirement [is] based entire-
ly on federal law and may be proved without regard to the elements of the 
state crime,” and “[s]ubstantial evidence, independent of [the defendant’s] 
admission, show[ed] that the victim was his wife.”77  Therefore, “it does not 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
 71.  See Flores, 350 F.3d at 666.  
72. Id. at 669. 
73. Id. at 670-71. 
74. Id. at 670. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 671. 
77. Flores, 350 F.3d at 670-71.  
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matter for purposes of federal law that the crime . . . is the same whether the 
victim is one’s wife or a drinking buddy . . . .”78   
Then in 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified what docu-
ments may be consulted when using the modified-categorical approach.79  
In Tokatly v. Ashcroft, an alien argued that he could not be deported for a 
crime of violence because the underlying state statute did not have a domes-
tic-relationship element, but in a post-conviction hearing before the Immi-
gration Judge (IJ), the victim testified that she had cohabitated with the al-
ien.80  The court reiterated that “[w]hen possible, we apply the ‘categorical’ 
approach, ‘looking only to the statutory definition[ ] of the prior offense.’”81  
But “when it is not clear from the statutory definition of the prior offense 
whether that offense constitutes a removable offense under section 
237(a)(2)(E)(i), we apply a ‘modified’ categorical approach” and “look be-
yond the . . . statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that are part of 
the record of conviction, including ‘the indictment, the judgment of convic-
tion, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea 
proceedings.’”82  When those documents “are insufficient to establish that 
the offense . . . qualifies as a basis for removal,” the alien may not be de-
ported based on that conviction.83 
The court went on to point out that it could not look at anything except 
the record of conviction “to determine whether an alien’s crime was one of 
‘violence,’ or whether the violence was ‘domestic’ within the meaning of 
the provision.”84  So, the court could not consider “testimonial evidence 
outside the record of conviction,” like the defendant’s admission that he had 
a domestic relationship with the victim85 or the victim’s testimony before 
the IJ.86  The court stated that the IJ’s examination of the victim was inap-
propriate fact finding under the categorical and modified-categorical ap-
proaches.87  Therefore, the burglary and kidnapping charges were not 
 
78. Id. 
 79. See generally Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004). 
80. Id. at 616. 
81. Id. at 620 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).  
82. Id. at 620 (quoting Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 908 (en banc)). 
83. Id. at 620-21 (citation omitted). 
84. Id. at 624. 
85. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624. 
86. Id. at 623. 
87. Id. 
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“crimes of ‘domestic violence’ under the categorical or modified categori-
cal approach.”88    
Before 2009, courts used both the categorical and modified categorical 
approaches to determine whether a state offense could qualify as a basis for 
removal.89  The Flores court did not use the terms categorical or modified-
categorical approach, but it considered evidence from a police report in de-
termining that a state battery conviction could qualify a defendant for re-
moval under § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), even though the state battery statute did not 
include a domestic-relationship element.90  The Tokatly court would not 
have considered a police report, but it would have looked beyond the state 
statute to the record of conviction.91  However, the Tokatly court would not 
allow a defendant’s admission or a victim’s testimony to an IJ to be used to 
satisfy the domestic requirement.92  But both courts agreed that it was ac-
ceptable to look beyond the underlying state criminal statute.93  In 2009, the 
Supreme Court went even further, allowing evidence beyond police reports 
and records of conviction by moving to a circumstance-specific approach.94 
2. The 2009 Supreme Court Holdings Not Requiring a Federal 
Statute’s Qualifying Terms to be Elements of the 
Predicate State Statutes and Using the 
Circumstance-Specific Approach 
In February of 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided U.S. v. 
Hayes.95  In Hayes, the Court held that for purposes of a statute that is 
worded identically to parts of § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), the term “domestic” did not 
need to be an element of the predicate state offense.96  The Court consid-
ered “[t]he definition of ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’” under 
the federal Gun Control Act of 1968,97 which prohibited anyone who had 
 
88. Id. at 624-25. 
 89.  See generally Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  
90. Flores, 350 F.3d at 670-71. 
91. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620 (quoting Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 908 (en banc)). 
92. Id. at 623-24. 
93. Flores, 350 F.3d at 671; Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620. 
 94.  Hayes, 555 U.S. at 415.  
 95.  Id. 
96. Id. at 429. 
       97. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (2012). 
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been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from pos-
sessing a firearm.98    
The Court reasoned that Congress used “element” – not “elements” – 
to mean that only the use-of-force requirement needed to be an element of 
the predicate state offense.99  It further reasoned that Gun Control Act 
“would have been ‘a dead letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the 
very moment of its enactment”100 because when the Gun Control Act was 
expanded to include misdemeanors, “only about one-third of the States had 
criminal statutes that specifically proscribed domestic violence.”101  The 
Court concluded that “Congress defined ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence’ to include an offense ‘committed by’ a person who had a speci-
fied domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor 
statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an element of the 
crime.”102 
Later that same year, the Supreme Court also held that – at least in the 
immigration context – courts could use the circumstance-specific approach 
in determining whether predicate state offenses satisfied the generic federal 
deportation statute.103  In Nijhawan v. Holder, the defendant was convicted 
of “mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering,” but those 
statutes did not require findings of particular loss amounts, so the jury did 
not make any findings about loss amounts.104  “At sentencing [he] stipulat-
ed that the loss exceeded $100 million.”105   
The government sought to have him deported arguing that he had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.106  The generic federal immigration stat-
ute stated that an “‘alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable.’”107  “A related statute defines ‘aggra-
vated felony’ in terms of a set of listed offenses that includes ‘an offense 
that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 
exceeds $10,000.’”108  The IJ agreed that the defendant had been convicted 
 
98. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418. 
99. Id. at 421-22. 
100. Id. at 427 (quotation omitted). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 429. 
 103.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 32.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 33. 
107. Id. at 32 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).  
108. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). 
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of an aggravated felony based on his finding “that the sentencing stipulation 
and restitution order showed that the victims’ loss exceeded $10,000.”109 
The Court focused on whether the $10,000 loss should be interpreted as 
referring to a generic crime – in which case the categorical approach had to 
be used – or “as referring to the specific way in which an offender commit-
ted the crime on a specific occasion” – where the circumstance-specific ap-
proach should be used instead.110  The Court decided against applying the 
categorical approach.111  The Court pointed out that unlike in Taylor, the 
federal statute “contains some language that refers to generic crimes and 
some language that . . . refers to the specific circumstances in which a crime 
was committed.”112   
First, the federal statute “refers to ‘an offense that . . . involves fraud or 
deceit in which the loss to the victim . . . exceeds $10,000,”113 which “is 
consistent with a circumstance-specific approach” because “the words ‘in 
which’ (which modify ‘offense’) can refer to the conduct involved ‘in’ the 
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the 
offense.”114  Second, applying a categorical approach would leave the rele-
vant part of the federal statute with almost no meaningful application be-
cause there is “no widely applicable federal fraud statute that contains a rel-
evant monetary loss threshold.”115  Therefore, the circumstance-specific 
approach was appropriate,116 and there was nothing unfair about the IJ rely-
ing on the defendant’s stipulation at sentencing and the court’s restitution 
order, which showed that the amount in question was much greater than 
$10,000.117 
After 2009, it seemed clear that courts could use the circumstance-
specific approach in immigration cases.118  It appeared that the domestic re-
quirement of the INA did not need to be an element of a predicate state of-
fense.119  But not all circuits agreed. 
 
 
109. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 33.  
110. Id. at 34.  
 111.  Id. at 38. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (quoting § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).  
114. Id. at 38-39. 
115. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 39. 
116. Id. at 40. 
117. Id. at 42-43. 
118. Id. at 40. 
119. See id. at 40; Hayes, 555 U.S. at 429.  
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3. The Post-2009 Circuit Split Over Using the Circumstance-
Specific Approach 
After the Hayes and Nijhawan decisions, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 
have used the circumstance-specific approach in immigration cases.120  
However, the Ninth Circuit Court has not used it in cases applying the 
INA’s crime-of-domestic-violence provision.121  So Tokatly, which applied 
only the categorical and modified-categorical approaches in determining 
whether a defendant committed a crime of domestic violence, is still the law 
in the Ninth Circuit.122   
Specifically, in 2010, the Fifth Circuit held in Bianco v. Holder that a 
crime of domestic violence does not need a domestic-relation element.123  
Instead, the domestic relationship “can be proven by evidence generally 
admissible for proof of facts in administrative proceedings.”124  So, a prob-
able-cause affidavit, criminal complaint, defendant’s pleadings, and sen-
tencing sheet were all considered “sufficient, admissible proof” of a convic-
tion for a crime of domestic violence.125   
Additionally, in November of 2015, the Fourth Circuit used the cir-
cumstance-specific approach in Hernandez-Zavala.126  The Fourth Circuit 
held that like the monetary qualifier in Nijhawan and – more importantly – 
the domestic-relationship qualifier in Bianco, the word domestic is a quali-
fier.127  Therefore, the underlying offense did not need to include a domes-
tic-relationship element.128  Instead, the domestic-relationship qualifier “re-
quires a fact-specific review” using the circumstance-specific approach.129   
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the INA incorporated the definition of 
a “crime of violence” by reference under 18 U.S.C. § 16 but limited depor-
tation to offenders in domestic relationships with their victims.130  In fact, 
18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a “crime of violence” as “‘an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another[,]’” so it is “even more clear in the INA 
 
120. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267; Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272.  
121. See Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916.  
122. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624-25.  
123. Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272. 
124. Id. at 272-73. 
125. Id. 
 126.  See generally Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2015).  
127. Id. at 267 (quotation omitted). 
128. Id. (citing Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272). 
129.  Id. (quotation omitted). 
130. Id. at 266 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)).  
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than in the statute at issue in Hayes that the term ‘element’ applies only to 
the use of force requirement[,]” and not to the domestic-relationship re-
quirement.131  The Fourth Circuit repeated the rule that when Congress puts 
such limitations “‘in the INA proper,’ it indicates its ‘intent to have the rel-
evant facts found in immigration proceedings.’”132 
The Fourth Circuit also emphasized that “Congress passed the INA’s 
‘crime of domestic violence’ provision in 1996, the same year it passed . . . 
the statute at issue in Hayes.”133  “Just as in Hayes, to construe this statute 
as requiring the domestic relationship to be an element of the underlying of-
fense ‘would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose,’ given that the law 
‘would have been ‘a dead letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the 
very moment of its enactment.’”134  Finally, to alleviate fears of opening 
floodgates to mini-trials by using the circumstance-specific approach, the 
Fourth Circuit pointed out that determining whether the domestic-
relationship requirement has been met “involves the inspection of a single 
threshold fact” that “will often be straightforward and objective . . . ,”135 be-
cause as the Hayes Court pointed out, determining whether the victim had a 
domestic relationship with the defendant does not often require an “‘elabo-
rate factfinding process.’”136 
But the Ninth Circuit has not yet used the circumstance-specific ap-
proach in determining whether a defendant is deportable under the INA’s 
crime-of-domestic-violence provision.  Before the 2009 Supreme Court de-
cisions in Hayes and Nijhawan, the Ninth Circuit held in Cisneros-Perez v. 
Gonzales that the “modified categorical approach applies to prior crimes of 
domestic violence in the immigration context . . . .”137  In addition, in Car-
rillo v. Holder, there was a categorical match to the predicate domestic-
violence offense, so the Ninth Circuit did not need to consider whether the 
circumstance-specific approach applied.138  It used the categorical approach 
again in Olivas-Motta v. Holder, a case about a crime involving moral tur-
pitude – which is deportable under a different section of the INA – not a 
 
131. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16). 
132. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266 (quoting Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1691).  
 133.  Id. at 267. 
134. Id. (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427). 
135. Id.  
136. Id. (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427 n.9). 
137. Cisneros-Perez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Tokatly, 371 F.3d 
at 613).  
138. Carrillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied Marquez Carillo v. 
Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1217 (2016). 
          
104 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1 
 
crime of domestic violence.139  In June of 2015, the Ninth Circuit in Arce 
Fuentes v. Lynch finally followed Nijhawan to hold that the circumstance-
specific approach applied in the same scenario involved in Nijhawan: when 
a case involves the INA’s $10,000 threshold for an aggravated felony.140  
But whether the Ninth Circuit would use that approach for a case about a 
crime of domestic violence is still unclear, creating the current circuit split. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This circuit split exists for several reasons.  Courts have misapplied law 
and have used different approaches when addressing different sections of 
the INA, so results have been inconsistent at best and absurd at worst.  The 
circuit split could have been remedied years ago or could still be resolved 
the next time the Ninth Circuit hears a case about deportation based on a 
crime of domestic violence.   
A. COURTS HAVE MISAPPLIED LAW, YIELDING ABSURD RESULTS 
First, as the Nijhawan Court suggested, cases about the INA’s domes-
tic-violence provision do not compare apples-to-apples to Taylor.141  In 
Taylor, there was no qualifier: the case was about burglary, not about bur-
glary with a certain victim or a certain threshold amount stolen.142  The 
Taylor court discussed grouping crimes by level of seriousness and who 
commits them,143 not by whom the victim is, which these INA crime-of-
domestic-violence cases like Tokatly focused on.144  The Tokatly court 
should have focused on this distinction and concluded that the circum-
stance-specific approach was appropriate and that burglary and kidnapping 
against a victim the alien lived with were crimes of domestic violence.145  
The categorical and modified-categorical approaches still need to be the 
starting point for analysis involving parts of federal statutes referring to ge-
neric crimes,146 but the circumstance-specific approach should have been 
available since Tokatly was incorrectly decided in 2004. 
 
139. Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916.  
140. Arce Fuentes v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2015). 
141. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38 (stating that unlike in Taylor, the federal statute “contains 
some language that refers to generic crimes and some language that, almost certainly refers to the 
specific circumstances in which a crime was committed”). 
142. See generally Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
143. Id. at 590. 
144. E.g., Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 616.  
145. Contra id. at 624. 
146. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 268 (quoting Bianco, 624 F.3d at 73).  
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Another problem is that courts are still using the categorical and modi-
fied-categorical approaches when dealing with other sections of the INA, 
which muddies the waters and makes unnecessary distinctions applying dif-
ferent approaches to INA provisions.  For example, the court in Olivas-
Motta used the categorical approach in a case under the INA provision 
about crimes involving moral turpitude.147  Although it applied the circum-
stance-specific approach in Hayes and Nijhawan, the United States Su-
preme Court in Moncrieffe used the categorical approach, not the circum-
stance-specific approach, in a deportation case after Nijhawan.148  It 
reasoned that the type of drug-offense statute involved was incorporated in 
the INA wholesale, so “it ‘must refer to generic crimes.’”149  Therefore, the 
Court determined the categorical approach applied.150  Yet even the Ninth 
Circuit in Fuentes v. Lynch applied the circumstance-specific approach 
when a case involves the INA’s $10,000 threshold for an aggravated felony, 
which is directly on point with Nijhawan.151   
The final problem is that using the categorical approach can yield ab-
surd results.  For example, in a pre-Hayes and Nijhawan case, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction was not cat-
egorically a crime of violence or a crime of domestic violence under the 
INA.152  That same year, the same court held that battery is not categorical-
ly a crime of violence.153  Surely Congress meant for crimes about violence 
– and more specifically, domestic violence – to constitute crimes of domes-
tic violence under the INA. 
B. SOLVING THE PROBLEM BY INCORPORATING THE CIRCUMSTANCE-
SPECIFIC APPROACH INTO THE INA AND DELETING THE 
WORD DOMESTIC FROM THE CRIME-OF-DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE 
PROVISION 
Struggling through analyses from multiple old cases and deciding on a 
circuit-by-circuit basis which approach should apply to different parts of the 
INA is tedious, inefficient, and inherently unfair.  Instead, all three ap-
proaches should be used for all deportable-crimes provisions in the INA 
 
147. Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916.  
148. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 202.  
149. Id. (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37). 
150. Id.   
151. Fuentes v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2015). 
152. Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006). 
153. Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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that are not generic offenses.  As to the crime-of-domestic-violence provi-
sion, Congress should simply delete the domestic qualifier and provide for 
deportation for any crime of violence.  Then, the circuit split about which 
approach should be used becomes irrelevant, as even the most limited cate-
gorical approach would allow for deportation based on a categorical match 
with a crime of violence.154 
1. The Circumstance-Specific Approach Should be the Test for 
all Deportable Crimes 
“Although the categorical approach . . . has ‘a long pedigree’ in immi-
gration law,”155 and Congress has specified “‘conviction, not conduct, as 
the trigger for immigration consequences,’”156 once the defendant has been 
convicted, it requires no mini-trial to determine who the victim was or 
many of the other factors listed in the INA, like monetary amounts or 
whether a crime is one of moral turpitude.157  For most – if not all – of the 
deportable crimes in the INA, Congress cannot account for what each pred-
icate state statute will prohibit or what language each state legislature will 
use in its statute.  This has been problematic since the Court in Taylor first 
articulated the three approaches.158  But when a statute like the INA in-
cludes what appear to be generic crimes with qualifying terms, courts are 
already using,159 and should continue to use, the circumstance-specific ap-
proach without rehashing the entire analyses from cases like Taylor, Hayes, 
and Nijhawan each time.  Congress could resolve this circuit split by adding 
a section allowing for all three approaches to be used or amending each sec-
tion it used qualifiers in to allow courts to use the circumstance-specific ap-
proach. 
2. Defendants Should Be Deportable for Committing any Crime 
of Violence, Regardless of Who the Victim Is 
Congress could also resolve the narrower issue about which test applies 
in cases involving a crime of domestic violence by deleting the word do-
mestic and providing for deportation of all defendant aliens for all crimes of 
violence.  Congress added the crime-of-domestic-violence provision to pro-
 
154. See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190-91. (quotation omitted). 
155. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 263-64 (quoting Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191). 
156. Id. at 264 (quoting Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015)). 
157. Id. at 267 (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427 n.9).  
158. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575.  
159. See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 263. 
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tect domestic victims and punish domestic-violence perpetrators,160 but do-
mestic victims are not the only victims of violent crimes.  And despite Con-
gress’ intent, some domestic victims are currently unprotected.  For exam-
ple, in Tokatly, the alien was not deported161 although he lived with and had 
a romantic relationship with the victim.162  The victim would have been 
protected if the defendant had been prosecuted under a domestic-violence 
statute.163  And the defendant would have been deportable for several other 
things that might not have physically harmed victims, like if he violated a 
protection order with a credible threat of – not action of – violence,164 
committed document fraud,165 or had been addicted to drugs.166  That 
makes little sense and is easily remedied by deleting a single word. 
Deleting the word domestic would eliminate questions about whether 
IJ’s should review any material beyond the record and would allow the INA 
to better serve the same basic purpose of deporting violent criminals.167  It 
would also improve the INA’s effectiveness because applying the categori-
cal and modified-categorical approaches sometimes leaves parts of the INA 
meaningless: as the court in Hernandez-Zavala pointed out when it quoted 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes, “requiring the domes-
tic relationship to be an element of the underlying offense ‘would frustrate 
Congress’ manifest purpose,’ given that the law ‘would have been ‘a dead 
letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the very moment of its enact-
ment.’”168  It would also be better public policy to have the same conse-
quences apply to all convicted defendant aliens, instead of leaving it to 
charging prosecutors to bring charges and handle plea bargaining based on 
the potential deportation consequences convictions would have.169   
 
160. Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1138 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 
S4058–02, S4059 (1996) (statement of Sen. Dole); (citations omitted).  
161. Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624.  
162. Id. at 616-17.  
163. See id. 
164. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii) (2008). 
165. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(3)(C) (2008). 
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (2008). 
167. See Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1138 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (quoting 142 CONG. 
REC. S4058–02, S4059 (1996) (statement of Sen. Dole); (citations omitted). 
168. Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427).  
169. See Bianco, 624 F.3d at 273.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have used the circumstance-specific ap-
proach to hold that the predicate state offense does not need to include a 
domestic-relationship element for a defendant alien to be deportable for 
committing a crime of domestic violence.170  However, the Ninth Circuit 
still applies the categorical and modified-categorical approaches in cases 
about crimes of domestic violence.171  But it has used the circumstance-
specific approach in a case about another INA provision.172 
This circuit split may be resolved the next time the Ninth Circuit de-
cides a case about whether a defendant has committed a crime of domestic 
violence that does not get resolved under the categorical and modified-
categorical approaches.  However, the problem could be addressed more 
quickly if Congress added the circumstance-specific approach to the INA.  
Better yet, Congress could delete the word domestic from the provision 
providing for deportation for convictions of crimes of domestic violence.  
That would eliminate the need to determine which approach applies, result 
in more consistent consequences without regard to the approach the juris-
diction applies or whether the alien was prosecuted under a specific domes-
tic-violence statute, and – most importantly – protect more domestic and 
non-domestic victims.  
 
 
 
 
170. Id. at 272; Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267. 
171. See Carrillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied Marquez Caril-
lo v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1217 (2016). 
172. Fuentes, 788 F.3d at 1181.  
